IN THE NEWS: United States must go ‘low profile’ in Pakistan

Late on Presidents Day I received a call confirming the beginning of the end of the Musharraf era in Pakistan. A close Pakistani friend wanted to let me know that the people of his country had clearly rejected the Bush administration’s favorite general in favor of a democratic alternative, simultaneously marking the beginning of the restoration of democracy in Pakistan and leaving U.S.-Pakistani policy in tatters.

It was perhaps fitting that this particular friend confirmed that Musharraf’s rule was effectively over; for it was he who had organized a small demonstration I attended in front of the Pakistani embassy in October 1999 after the general had come to power in a bloodless coup.

In the years since that coup (particularly post 9/11), U.S. policy has focused on supporting the general who was viewed by the foreign policy intelligentsia as a bulwark against fundamentalism.

As we know, the fallacy of this position became increasingly clear as the general moved against popular moderate movements within his country, thereby forcing anti-government sentiment to seek an outlet among fundamentalist entities. The cycle was broken when the late Benazir Bhutto returned to Pakistan and the general was forced to move toward elections.

Elections results have made it clear that Bhutto’s Pakistani Peoples Party stands poised to lead a ruling coalition with former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League-N. Their first action may well be to impeach Musharraf if he does not accept that the people voted for fundamental change when they rejected his allies at the ballot box.

It is likely that the new government will quickly move to restore the judiciary and will begin to address the real dangers posed by the rise in militancy during the Musharraf years.

Moderates in Pakistan will be encouraged by the fact that the Awami National Party, a campaign for Pashtun nationalism, defeated the Islamist incumbents in the North West Frontier Province. The dramatic defeat may hint at the approach the new government will adopt as it seeks to challenge the fundamentalists; there is a real sense among many analysts that coalition will push a Pakistani response to fundamentalism and will de-emphasize the U.S. role.

If the new ruling coalition does in fact move in this direction, the U.S. administration needs to decide how it will respond. What should U.S. policy toward Pakistan be after this hammer blow to Musharraf?

First, the U.S. must recognize the analytical failures of its current policy. Musharraf’s rule fostered fundamentalism and it is only through democracy that the country can be turned back toward moderation.

The U.S. should support Pakistani efforts to secure a United Nations-led investigation into the assassination of Bhutto. This is a critical first step toward the restoration of the rule of law in Pakistan. The Pakistanis need to believe in their government and this investigation must take place as soon as possible.

Second, the reinstatement of the Supreme Court chief justice and other judges must happen soon. It has been a rallying cry for the opposition, and constructive U.S. support for such a move may be helpful during the transition.

Third, the U.S. should support Pakistani-led efforts to address the challenges of the North West Frontier Province. It may be necessary to secure international donor assistance for the area and the U.S. should work with the Pakistani government and financial institutions like the World Bank to generate both the funds and the necessary technical assistance required.

Finally, it is important to note that past democratically elected governments in Pakistan have historically been undermined by charges of corruption. The U.S. should encourage the new government to adopt global best practices to ensure that past errors are not repeated.

The U.S. needs to be willing to take a low profile toward Pakistan in the months ahead. Taking a “low profile” does not mean disengagement; it simply recognizes that the most effective approach to rolling back fundamentalism in Pakistan may be through a Pakistani centric response. The U.S. should support such efforts.

Raj Purohit is Interim Director and Senior Fellow at Citizens for Global Solutions, a Washington, D.C.-based foreign policy advocacy organization.